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ARREST WARRANTS REQUIRED FOR
ARRESTS WITHIN THE HOME-
PAYTON V. NEW YORK
The fourth amendment I requires law enforcement officers to obtain a
search warrant before entering a home to search for fruits and instrumentali-
ties of a crime I or before conducting a wiretap for conversations of a criminal
nature. 3  Despite these broad protections accorded a person's possessions
and thoughts, until recently the United States Supreme Court had never
required law enforcement officers to obtain an arrest or search warrant be-
fore entering a home to arrest its residents.' This anomaly in fourth amend-
ment law has been the subject of much judicial commentary.5
1. U.S. CONST. amend. IV provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particu-
larly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
2. See, e.g., Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 454-55 (1971) (warrantless search
of a home is per se unreasonable subject only to a few specifically established exceptions); Vale
v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30, 33 (1970) (no exceptions present to uphold the warrantless search of
a home); Taylor v. United States, 286 U.S. 1, 6 (1932) (search without a warrant is unreason-
able); Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20, 32 (1925) (the search of a private dwelling without
a warrant is abhorent to our laws). For a discussion of the various exceptions that allow law
enforcement officials to search premises without a warrant, see C. WHITEBREAD, CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE 133-140, 152-170, 197-225 (1st ed. 1980) [hereinafter cited as WHITEBREAD].
3. See, e.g., Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967). In Berger, the Court held that a
search warrant particularly describing the conversations to be seized by wiretapping devices
must be obtained "'before the innermost secrets of one's home or office [can be] invaded." Id. at
63.
4. In Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980), the Court stated that the question of
whether a warrant is needed to arrest a suspect in his home had been expressly left open in
prior decisions. Id. at 592. See United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 418 n.6 (1976); Ger-
stein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 113 n.13 (1975); Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493, 499-500
(1958).
5. See United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 427-28 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring). jus-
tice Powell wrote: "Logic therefore would seem to dictate that arrests be subject to the warrant
requirement at least to the same extent as searches." Id. at 429.
Justice Stewart, writing for the majority in Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443
(1971), stated:
If it is reasonable for the police to make a warrantless nighttime entry for the
purpose of arresting a person in his bed, then surely it must be reasonable as well
to make a warrantless entry to search for and seize vital evidence of a serious
crime .... If we were to agree with MR. JUSTICE WHITE that the police may,
whenever they have probable cause, make a warrantless entry for the purpose of
making an arrest . . . then by the same logic any search or seizure could be carried




In Payton v. New York,6 the Court rectified this incongruous situation,
holding that absent exigent circumstances, police officers will be required to
obtain an arrest warrant before entering a home to arrest a resident of the
home.' This decision overturned statutes in twenty-three states' and settled
an issue extensively debated in the federal courts of appeals.' In addition,
this holding reversed what many commentators and courts considered "text-
book law for centuries" 1-0the right of law enforcement officers to arrest
without a warrant in the home.
This Note supports the Payton Court's decision to require arrest warrants
for arrests within a home, but criticizes the Court's failure to set forth
adequate standards for future applications of its holding. Due to the Court's
failure to establish such standards, a discussion of possible alternative guide-
lines is presented. Finally, Payton's impact on the preliminary hearing is
discussed.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Payton v. New York " was a consolidation of two New York cases that both
upheld the police officer's right to effect warrantless arrests within a home.
The defendant in the first case, Theodore Payton, had been charged with
murder." Two days after the victim's death, a police investigation uncov-
Still other courts have held that it is "incongruous" to protect the individual's belongings
but not to protect the individual. See, e.g., United States v. Prescott, 581 F.2d 1343, 1349 (9th
Cir. 1978); United States v. Reed, 572 F.2d 412, 424 (2d Cir. 1978); People v. Ramey, 16 Cal.
3d 263, 275, 545 P.2d 1333, 1340, 127 Cal. Rptr. 629, 636 (1976). See generally N. LASSEN,
THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT To THE UNITED STATES
CONSTITUTION 13-50 (1937) (the fourth amendment really protects people, not property). See
also Lankford v. Gelston, 364 F.2d 197, 205 (4th Cir. 1966) (from the victim's viewpoint the
invasion of the privacy of his home is unaffected by the object of the officer's search).
6. 445 U.S. 573 (1980).
7. Id. at 603. The Payton Court expressly declined to address the question of whether the
warrantless entry of a home to arrest a visitor would be valid. Id. at 583. For an indication of
how the Court might rule on this unanswered question, see Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128,
141-43 (1978) (dicta) (mere visitor in a home lacks standing to challenge the validity of a search).
8. Citations to the twenty-three overturned statutes can be found at 445 U.S. at 598 11.46.
9. Id. at 575 nn.3 & 4.
10. Commonwealth v. Forde, 367 Mass. 798, 812, 329 N.E.2d 717, 726 (1975) (Quirco, J.,
dissenting). See also United States ex rel. Wright v. Woods, 432 F.2d 1143, 1146 (7th Cir.
1970) (the Constitution has never been read to require an arrest warrant before entering a
private building); Michael v. United States, 393 F.2d 22, 32 (10th Cir. 1968) (no need to obtain
a warrant to enter premises to arrest); Shanks v. Commonwealth, 463 S.W.2d 312, 315 (Ky. Ct.
App. 1971) (the law is universal that an officer can enter a home to arrest whenever he has
probable cause to believe a felony has been committed); State v. Novak, 428 S.W.2d 585,
591-92 (Mo. 1968) (it is well settled that one can arrest without a warrant); C. ToRCIA,
WHARTON'S CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 82, at 202 (12th ed. 1974) (at common law the state could
enter a home without a warrant to effect an arrest); Wilgus, Arrest Without a Warrant, 22
MICH. L. REv. 541, 558 (1924) (the general rule is that an arrest may be made anywhere).
11. 445 U.S. 573 (1980).
12. Id. at 577.
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ered sufficient evidence to establish probable cause to believe Payton com-
mitted the murder. Early the next morning, police arrrived at Payton's
home in the Bronx without an arrest warrant." They knocked, but when no
one answered, they forcibly entered the unoccupied apartment and seized a
30-caliber shell casing."4 Payton later surrendered to police and moved in a
pre-trial hearing to suppress the admission of the shell casing." The lower
court denied his request," holding that the New York Code of Criminal
Procedure authorized the warrantless entry."
The second case consolidated in Payton concerned the narcotics conviction
of Obie Riddick. In this case, police entered Riddick's apartment to arrest
him for his participation in two armed robberies that had occurred almost
two years earlier." The police officers failed to obtain an arrest warrant
before entering; yet, because the robbery victims had identified Riddick
almost one year earlier as their assailant, the officers had ample time to do
so." While in the apartment, police seized narcotics and related
paraphernalia. "' At a pre-trial hearing to suppress the evidence, the trial
13. id.
14. When police entered Payton's apartment they searched every room for the suspect. In
addition to seizing the shell casing in plain view on top of the stereo, the officers seized a
shotgun with ammunition from a closet, and in a dresser drawer found a sales receipt for a
Winchester rifle and photographs of the defendant wearing a ski mask. People v. Payton, 45
N.Y.2d 300, 305, 380 N.E.2d 224, 226, 408 N.Y.S.2d 395, 397 (1978).
15. The other items seized from the apartment were voluntarily suppressed by the District
Attorney. Id. at 305-06, 380 N.E.2d at 226, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 397.
16. People v. Payton, 84 Misc. 2d 973, 376 N.Y.S.2d 779 (Sup. Ct. 1974). The lower court
held that the shell casing had been inadvertently observed by the officers while legally in
Payton's apartment. 45 N.Y.2d at 306, 380 N.E.2d at 226, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 397. Thus, the
seizure of the shell casing fell within the "plain view" exception to the search warrant require-
ment. For a general discussion of plain view seizures, see WHITEBREAD, supra note 2, at 211-
225.
17. 84 Misc. 2d at 974-75, 376 N.Y.S.2d at 780-81. Two New York statutes in effect at the
time of the officers' entry into Payton's apartment authorized the entry. These were N.Y. CRIM.
PRoC. LAw §§ 177, 178 (McKinney 1964). Section 177 provided: "A peace officer may, without
a warrant, arrest a person . . . [wihen a felony has in fact been committed and he has reason-
able cause for believing the person to be arrested to have committed it." Section 178 provided:
"To make an arrest as provided in the last section, the officer may break open an outer or inner
door or window of a building, if, after notice of his office and purpose, he be refused admit-
tance."
18. 445 U.S. at 578.
19. 45 N.Y.2d at 307, 380 N.E.2d at 227, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 397-98. The two officers were
accompanied by Riddick's parole officer. The parole officer first entered the home to determine
if Riddick was present. When the parole officer saw Riddick, he signaled the waiting policemen.
The officers knocked on the door and the defendant's three-year old son answered.
20. Id. The officers seized this evidence from Riddick's chest of drawers. This warrantless
search of his dresser was upheld as a valid search incident to an arrest. See W. RINGEL,
SEARCHES & SEIZURES, ARRESTS AND CONFESSIONS § 12.1, at 12-1 (2d ed. 1979) (discussion of
the officer's right to conduct a warrantless search incident to a valid arrest).
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judge upheld the warrantless entry to arrest and the subsequent seizure of
evidence," also relying upon New York statutory law.22
Intermediate state appellate courts upheld both convictions.' The New
York Court of Appeals affirmed on the basis of the historical acceptance of
warrantless entries. 4  After the New York Court of Appeals denied relief,
the petitioners successfully sought review in the United States Supreme
Court,25 claiming a violation of their fourth amendment rights. In a six to
three decision," the Court reversed the convictions, holding that absent exi-
gent circumstances, the fourth amendment requires police officers to obtain
an arrest warrant before entering a suspect's home to make a routine felony
arrest. 2.
BACKGROUND
Essential to an analysis of Payton is an understanding of the historical
background of the doctrine that arrests within a home should be accompa-
nied by an arrest warrant. This principle has developed through a series of
lower court cases decided predominantly since 1950.1' Three conceptual
21. 445 U.S. at 578.
22. Id. A revised warrantless arrest statute was in effect on the date of Riddick's arrest.
N.Y. CniM. PRoc. LAW §§ 120.80(4), 140.15(4) (McKinney 1971). Section 140.15(4) provided:
In order to effect an arrest without a warrant a police officer may enter premises in
which he reasonably believes such person to be present, tinder the same circun-
stances and in the same manner as would be authorized, by the provisions of subdi-
visions four and five of section 120.80, if he were attempting to make such an arrest
pursuant to a warrant of arrest.
Section 120.80(4) provided:
In order to effect the arrest, the police officer may under the circumstances and in
a manner prescribed in this subdivision, enter any premises in which he reasonably
believes the defendant to be present. Before such entry, he must give, or make
reasonable effort to give, notice of his authority and purpose to an occupant
thereof...
23. People v. Payton, 55 A.D.2d 859, 390 N.Y.S.2d 769 (1976); People v. Riddick, 56
A.D.2d 937, 392 N.Y.S.2d 848 (1977).
24. People v. Payton, 45 N.Y.2d at 311-12, 380 N.E.2d at 229-30, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 400-01
(1978).
25. People v. Payton, 439 U.S. 1044 (1979) (prob. juris. noted).
26. Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist joined in the dissent written by Justice
White. 445 U.S. at 603 (White, J., dissenting). Justice Rehnquist filed his own dissenting opin-
ion. Id. at 620 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
27. 445 U.S. at 603.
28. The question of whether warrantless arrests within a home are constitutional has been
asked only recently. As Justice White noted in his dissent, nineteenth century litigators failed to
raise the question "because warrantless arrest entries were so firmly accepted at common law."
445 U.S. at 611 (White, J., dissenting). The failure to raise this issue also can be explained by
the nonexistence of the exclusionary rule during the nineteenth century. Without such a rule,
litigators had little to gain by raising this issue because the law held then, as it does today, that
an invalid arrest will not deny a court jurisdiction over the arrestee. See notes 109-111 and
accompanying text infra. See generally Ann.Cas. 1912B, 566, noting that Commonwealth v.
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trends emanated from these cases: a rejection of the common law "power to
arrest" theory, acceptance of a bifurcated analytic framework, and the emer-
gence of a balancing of interests approach.
Rejection of the "Power to Arrest" Theory
The first concept found in the pre-Payton case law is a rejection of the
common law doctrine of the power to arrest. Under that doctrine, a warrant-
less arrest was deemed lawful if the officer had probable cause to believe the
arrestee had committed a felony." Because the common law gave law en-
forcement officers the power to arrest without a warrant, some lower courts
assumed that this power was exercisable anywhere, even inside an arrestee's
home.3" Characteristic of these decisions is Commonwealth v. Phelps,"'
where the focus of the court's analysis was whether the requisite probable
cause to arrest was present; the question of whether the entry into the home
to arrest without a warrant was constitutionally permissible was ignored.32
Eventually, courts rejected the theory that the power to arrest is a power
exercisable in all locations.33 In Accarino v. United States,34 for example,
the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia restricted
warrantless entries of homes to arrest defendants by requiring officers to use
reasonable judgment in deciding whether a warrant should be obtained. In
Accarino, the court refused to uphold the warrantless entry into the home to
arrest the defendant because it found the entry unreasonable in light of the
nonviolent nature of the defendant's crime.' The court observed, however,
Phelps, 209 Mass. 396, 95 N.E. 868 (1911), was the first case to answer directly the question of
whether an officer can enter a home and arrest its owner without a warrant.
29. See WHITEBREAD, supra note 2, at 70-71.
30. See People v. Johnson, 45 I11. 2d 283, 288, 259 N.E.2d 57, 60 (1970) (an arrest in the
home may be lawful when based upon probable cause, notwithstanding the lack of a warrant);
Shanks v. Commonwealth, 463 S.W.2d 312, 315 (Ky. 1971) (the law allows the officer to enter a
home if he has probable cause to believe a felony has been committed); State v. Novak, 428
S.W.2d 585, 591 (Mo. 1968) (arrest within a home upheld based on the existence of probable
cause to arrest).
31. 209 Mass. 396, 95 N.E. 868 (1911).
32. Id. at 407-08, 95 N.E. at 873.
33. See, e.g., United States v. Reed, 572 F.2d 412 (2d Cir. 1978) (warrantless arrest in
home may be lawful when based upon probable cause, notwithstanding the lack of a warrant);
385, 389 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (probable cause is sufficient to arrest in a public place but a greater
burden is placed on officials who arrest a suspect within his home).
34. 179 F.2d 456, 456-57 (D.C. Cir. 1949). Here, police observed the defendant for seven
days following a tip that he was involved in organized gambling. Undercover police also placed
bets with the defendant. On the tenth day of the investigation, without arrest or search war-
rants, officers approached the defendant outside his home and attempted to arrest him. When
he refused to stop and walked into his apartment, the officers kicked in the apartment door.
Inside they arrested defendant, seized the papers he was throwing on a desk, and searched his
person. The defendant challenged the admission of these papers into evidence at his trial.
35. Id. at 464.
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that exceptional circumstances (such as the commission of a violent crime)
could justify an otherwise similar warrantless entry.36 A recognition that
exceptional circumstances could signal a different result forms the ground-
work for decisions employing the balancing approach discussed below. 37 In
addition, Accarino and similar decisions are significant because they focused
on the propriety of entering a home without a warrant, instead of hinging
their analyses on the probable cause requirement, the key consideration
under a power to arrest theory.
Acceptance of a Bifurcated Analysis
Once courts shifted their focus of analysis away from the probable cause
requirement and toward the intrusion into the home, a bifurcated analysis of
an arrest within the home became possible. Viewed as a two-step procedure,
a home arrest requires that the officer first enter the home and search for
the arrestee, and only thereafter undertake an arrest.- Thus, under a bifur-
cated analysis, two bodies of constitutional law apply to this process-the
law of searches and the law of arrests.
The two-pronged analysis of an arrest within a home was first set forth in
Morrison v. United States.3" In Morrison, the court of appeals held that
mere authority to make a warrantless arrest is insufficient to justify an entry
into the home to search for the accused. ' The court explained that the
entry into the home is a search independent of the eventual arrest.4' Nine
years later, in Warden v. Hayden," the United States Supreme Court
appeared to accept the bifurcated arrest analysis. In that case, an armed
robbery suspect fled into his home five minutes after the robbery occurred.
Police officers, chasing the suspect, entered the home.43 The Court upheld
the warrantless entry, stating that the circumstances made it reasonable for
the officers to enter without a warrant to search for the defendant." The
36. Id.
37. See notes 47-55 and accompanying text infra.
38. The two-step analysis of an arrest is applicable even when the suspect answers the door
after police knock. Obviously, the officer need not search the home for the arrestee; yet, a
search is still inherent in this situation because the officer cannot know, until he knocks, if the
defendant will answer the door. See Dorman v. United States, 435 F.2d 385, 391 (D.C. Cir.
1970).
39. 262 F.2d 449 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
40. Id. at 452.
41. Id. Massachusetts is in accord with this view. For example, in Commonwealth v. Forde,
367 Mass. 798, 805, 329 N.E.2d 717, 722 (1975), the court stated that "the distinction between
an entry to search and an entry to arrest is slight, for the latter may be characterized as a search
for a person rather than a search for things."
42. 387 U.S. 294 (1967).
43. Id. at 296-97.
44. The Court stated:
We agree with the Court of Appeals that neither the entry without warrant to
search for the robber, nor the search for him without a warrant was invalid. Under
[Vol. 30:205
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Warden Court, in effect, gauged the validity of the warrantless search rather
than the validity of the warrantless arrest, thereby implicitly recognizing the
two-part analysis."5 Thus, Warden implied that a search warrant is needed
to search a home for an arrestee absent exigent circumstances."
The Balancing of Interests Approach
The acceptance of the bifurcated arrest analysis formed the groundwork
necessary for the development of a balancing of interests approach. Because
the bifurcated analysis provided that the initial entry into the home com-
prised a search, it was logical for courts next to examine the law governing
search warrants when confronting cases of warrantless arrests within a home.
The first court 7 to make such an examination utilized the balancing of in-
terests approach.
The balancing of interests approach was borrowed from fourth amendment
case law concerning administrative searches of homes. The United States
Supreme Court established this approach in Camara v. Municipal Court.41
In Camara, the Court weighed the homeowner's right of privacy against the
city's need to inspect homes for housing code violations. Balancing these
interests, the Court held that the homeowner's privacy should be invaded
only if a search warrant had been issued or if an emergency situation was
present. Under the balancing approach, then, the court issuing the search
warrant stands as a check between a citizen and overzealous law enforce-
ment officials. 41
In the leading case,5 Dorman v. United States,5' the Camara balancing
approach was applied to a situation involving a warrantless arrest within a
the circumstances of this case, "the exigencies of the situation made that course
imperative . They acted reasonably when they entered the house and began to
search for a man of the description they had been given and for weapons which he
had used in the robbery or might use against them.
Id. at 298-99 (emphasis added).
45. Decisions failing to grasp the distinction between the entry of the home to arrest and
the arrest itself have tended to reach results contrary to the Payton holding. See, e.g., cases
cited in note 30 supra.
46. Justice Stewart acknowledged this reading of Warden in Coolidge v. New Hampshire,
403 U.S. 443, 480-81 (1971).
47. Dorman v. United States, 435 F.2d 385 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
48. 387 U.S. 523 (1967). The United States Supreme Court has applied the Camara balanc-
ing approach in resolving various fourth amendment problems. See, e.g., Gerstein v. Pugh, 420
U.S. 103 (1975) (preliminary hearings); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1969) (stop and frisk).
49. 387 U.S. at 539-40. Cf. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1948) (a neutral
magistrate, not an overzealous officer, should determine when a home may be entered to search
and seize evidence).
50. Haddad, Arrest, Search and Seizure: Six Unexamined Issues in Illinois Law, 26 DEPAUL
L. REV. 492, 520 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Haddad].
51. 435 F.2d 385, 387-88 (D.C. Cir. 1970). Here, the petitioner robbed a clothing store. In
the process of the robbery, petitioner left behind his pants, which contained his identification.
Police found this information and went to Dorman's home without a warrant to arrest him.
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suspect's home.12  The Dorman court propounded seven factors to use in
determining when a homeowner's right to privacy should yield to society's
right to apprehend suspects quickly.53  Because Dorman has been widely
accepted, 5' these factors are often used to balance the interests involved in
home arrest cases. Indeed, within one year after the Dorman decision, the
United States Supreme Court, citing Dorman favorably, commented in dicta
on the constitutionality of warrantless home arrests."'
Various factors have emerged from case law to support the requirement
that arrests within a home be made pursuant to an arrest warrant. It was
within this historical context that the Court rendered its decision in Payton.
THE PAYTON DECISION
In Payton, the United States Supreme Court held that, absent exigent
circumstances, an arrest warrant is required before a police officer may enter
a home to arrest a resident of that home.- Writing for the six justice major-
ity, Justice Stevens maintained that the prohibition of warrantless arrests
within a home was a logical corollary of the well-accepted rule that warrant-
less searches of a person's home are impermissible. 7 The majority reasoned
that an entry to arrest "implicat[ed] the same interest in preserving the
privacy and sanctity of the home" ' as did an entry to seek and seize prop-
erty. Any difference between the two forms of entry into the home was, the
Court observed, only one of degree, not of kind. s9 The Court concluded
52. Before the Dorman court discussed the balancing of interests approach, it found that an
arrest within a home involves both a search of the home and an arrest. Id. at 389-93.
53. Id. at 392-93. These seven factors include: (1) the gravity of the offense; (2) the danger
the offender poses to the community; (3) a strong showing of probable cause to arrest; (4) strong
reason to believe the suspect is within the home about to be entered; (5) the likelihood that the
suspect will escape if the home is not entered immediately; (6) the peacefulness of the entry;
and (7) the time of entry. See text accompanying notes 104-107 infra.
54. The following courts have cited Dorman with approval: United States v. Reed, 572 F.2d
412, 422 (2d Cir. 1978); United States v. Killebrew, 560 F.2d 729, 733 (6th Cir. 1977); United
States v. Shye, 492 F.2d 886, 891 (6th Cir. 1974); United States v. l)avis, 461 F.2d 426, 430
(3d Cir. 1972); United States v. Harris, 435 F.2d 74, 80 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Vance v. North
Carolina, 432 F.2d 984, 990 (4th Cir. 1970); People v. Ramey, 16 Cal. 3d 263, 273, 545 P.2d
1333, 1339, 127 Cal. Rptr. 629, 637 (1976); People v. Moreno, 176 Colo. 488, 497, 491 P.2d
575, 580 (1971); People v. Abiey, 81 111. 2d 159, 164, 407 N.E.2d 543, 548 (1980); Nilson v.
State, 272 Md. 179, 187, 321 A.2d 301, 305 (1974); Commonwealth v. Forde, 367 Mass. 798,
805, 329 N.E.2d 717, 723 (1975).
55. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971). In Coolidge, the Court reasoned that
if the state could seize a person without an arrest warrant then logic would dictate that it be
able to seize an object without a warrant. Thus, a holding that warrantless arrests within a home
are constitutional would render the fourth amendment warrant requirement a nullity. Id. at
479-80. However, as the Court noted, this discussion constituted mere dictum. Id. at 481.
56. 445 U.S. at 590.
57. Id. at 586-90.
58. Id. at 588.
59. Id. at 589.
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that because a search warrant is needed to enter a home to search for prop-
erty, an arrest warrant is similarly needed to enter a home to arrest the
home's resident.'
In support of its decision, the Court refuted the state's argument that a
historical analysis of the problem would lead to the conclusion that arrest
warrants are not required for arrests within the home.' Rather, it explained
that no single common law position existed in favor of warrantless arrests
within a home.' Moreover, while the Court acknowledged that many states
have enacted statutes permitting warrantless arrests within the home,' it
also noted the recent state trend to reject the validity of such arrests.6 ,
Finally, the Court stated that Congress had never determined that such en-
tries were reasonable.6 Thus, the Court concluded that a historical analysis
was not dispositive of the issue.
CRITIQUE OF THE DECISION
Although the Payton decision correctly expanded fourth amendment pro-
tections, it is flawed in two respects. First, Payton unnecessarily suggested
that the Court might be withdrawing from the principles of fourth amend-
ment privacy set forth in Katz v. United States." Second, the Court failed
to provide adequate guidelines for future applications of its holding.
Several reasons support the conclusion that the Payton decision correctly
expanded fourth amendment protections. First, the decision rectified a pre-
vious incongruous situation in which a warrant was a prerequisite to enter a
home and seize the resident's property but not to effect his or her arrest. 7
In addition, the decision reaffirmed prior Court emphasis of the sanctity of
the home as a cherished American right worthy of judicial protection.' Fur-
60. Id. at 590.
61. Id. at 591-601. Prior to Payton, several commentators had predicted that a historical
analysis of the issue of warrantless arrests within a home would lead to the conclusion that
arrest warrants would not be required. See People v. Ramey, 16 Cal. 3d 263, 278 n.2, 545 P.2d
1333, 1342-43 n.2, 127 Cal. Rptr. 629, 641 n.2 (1976) (Clark, J., dissenting); Haddad, supra
note 50, at 523; Comment, Watson and Santana: Death Knell for Arrest Warrants?, 28
SYRACUSE L. REV. 787, 807 (1977).
62. 445 U.S. at 591-98.
63. Id. at 598-600.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
67. See note 5 supra.
68. The fourth amendment has been characterized as "basic to a free society." Camara v.
Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967); Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27 (1949). When
courts have interpreted fourth amendment protections, they have recognized the unique pri-
vacy interests of the home. See, e.g., United States v. United States Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297,
313 (1972) (physical entry of the home is the chief evil against which the wording of the fourth
amendment is directed); Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961) (at the very core
of the fourth amendment stands the right of persons to retreat into their own home and there
1980] PAYTON
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ther, Payton infused new meaning into the arrest warrant requirement, and
therefore will promote fourth amendment protection. Prior to Payton, arrest
warrants had rarely been used in the United States.69 As a result of Payton,
however, the use of arrest warrants is likely to increase. Finally, Payton
should provide greater protection for the innocent arrestee. For example,
after an unjustified arrest, it is common for no complaint to be filed against
the arrestee and for the arrestee subsequently to be released. 70 Moreover,
occasionally police arrest the wrong person because they are misinformed
about the name or address of a suspect. 71 Under Payton's arrest warrant
requirement, these situations might be avoided as detached judicial officers
pass judgment on probable cause and in the process detect police mistakes.
Thus, following Payton, the fourth amendment can truly be read to be the
protector of a person and not just the protector of his or her property."
Despite its desirable conclusion, the Payton decision failed to apply the
fourth amendment principles established in Katz v. United States,73 a failure
the Payton dissenters noted.74 In Katz, the Court rejected the antiquated
notion that the defendant's location at the time of the search or arrest deter-
mines if his or her fourth amendment rights were violated. Instead, the
Court held that the fourth amendment protects a person's reasonable ex-
pectations of privacy regardless of where he or she was located at the time of
the alleged fourth amendment violation."M Thus, Katz requires that a court
focus its analysis on the defendant's reasonable expectations of privacy.
be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion); Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14
(1948) (the right of officers to thrust themselves into a home is a grave concern, not only to the
individual but also to a society that chooses to dwell in reasonable security).
69. J. LANDYNSKI, SEARCH & SEIZURE AND THE SUPREME COURT 45 (1966).
70. A. GERMAN & F. DAY, INTRODUCTION TO LAW ENFORCEMENT & CRIMINAL JUSTICE 234
(2d ed. 1973).
71. Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 57 (1963).
72. See notes 2-5 supra.
73. 389 U.S. 347 (1967). In Katz, the petitioner challenged the introduction of evidence
obtained when FBI agents attached electronic listening and recording devices to the outside of
a public phone booth. In reaching its decision that this evidence was obtained in violation of the
fourth amendment, the Court unhinged the fourth amendment from a property-oriented analy-
sis. The Court stated:
The Fourth Amendment protects people, not places. What a person knowingly ex-
poses to the public, even in his own home or office, is not the subject of Fourth
Amendment protection. But what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area
accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected.
Id. at 351-52.
74. 445 U.S. at 615 (White, J., dissenting). Justice White wrote:
Today's decision rests, in large measure, on the premise that warrantless arrest
entries constitute a particularly severe invasion of personal privacy. . . . However,
the Fourth Amendment is concerned with protecting people, not places, and no
talismanic significance is given to the fact that an arrest occurs in the home rather
than elsewhere.
Id.
75. 389 U.S..at 351.
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The Payton Court, however, did not. As the dissenters noted, the court
created the impression that it was retreating from Katz by emphasizing the
place of the arrest-the home-rather than the defendant's expectations of
privacy. Obviously, the fact that these arrests occurred within the sanctity of
the defendants' homes was at the crux of the Payton decision. Nevertheless,
the Court could have avoided the implication that it was subtly reverting to
a pre-Katz place-oriented reading of the fourth amendment by incorporating
Katz into its opinion. Incorporating Katz would not have altered the Court's
decision because both defendants, it could be argued, had reasonable ex-
pectations of privacy in their homes.-- Thus, the Court could have reached
the same result without creating an apparent inconsistency between Katz
and Payton and without lending credence to a view that it is eroding the
analytic foundation of Katz.
The second flaw in the Payton decision was the Court's failure to provide
guidelines as to what would constitute exigent circumstances sufficient to
overcome the warrant requirement.7 7 The Court declined to discuss exigent
circumstances because the New York Court of Appeals had treated both
cases consolidated in Payton as routine arrests allowing ample time to obtain
a warrant.-' The decision not to discuss exigent circumstances is faulty for
two reasons. First, because the New York Court of Appeals refused to man-
date a warrant requirement for arrests within the home, that court necessari-
ly ignored the possibility that sufficient exigent circumstances were present.
Hence, the failure of the New York court to discuss exigent circumstances
does not necessarily mean that those circumstances were absent. Second, as
one of the dissenting state judges noted, Payton had allegedly committed a
violent crime and was still armed and dangerous. 7  Because these facts
might potentially be characterized as exigent circumstances (indeed, attor-
76. United States v. Reed, 572 F.2d 412, 422 (2d Cir. 1978), stands for the proposition that
a criminal defendant has a reasonable expectation of privacy in his or her home. The Reed court
held that requiring an arrest warrant for arrests within a home is consistent with Katz. Id. at
422-23. Accord, United States v. Prescott, 581 F.2d 1343, 1348-49 (9th Cir. 1978) (while the
fourth amendment protects people not places, special emphasis is afforded the protection of
people in their homes).
77. 445 U.S. at 582-83.
78. Id. at 583.
79. People v Payton, 45 N.Y.2d 300, 315, 380 N.E.2d 224, 232, 408 N.Y.S.2d 395, 403
(1978) (Wachtler, J., dissenting). If the seven factor analysis set forth in Dorman v. United
States, see notes 104-07 and accompanying text infra, were applied in Payton, four of the seven
factors would be present: (1) the offense of murder is serious; (2) the suspect was dangerous; (3)
the likelihood of escape was great; and (4) there were strong reasons to believe Payton was
inside the apartment because a light was visible and music audible within the apartment. Id. at
315, 380 N.E.2d at 232, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 403. Because of the existence of these factors, a court
might have held that there were sufficient exigent circumstances to override the warrant re-
quirement.
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neys for the state had so argued), the Court should have discussed factors
sufficient to overcome the arrest warrant requirement."
By drawing on lower court opinions such as United States v. Dorman"
and its progeny, the Payton Court could have easily established a set of
guidelines for determining when law enforcement officers may legally forgo
obtaining an arrest warrant. A flexible balancing of interests framework
would have been a valuable asset for law enforcement officers. As Justice
White stated in his dissent,2 "[t]he policeman on his beat must now make
subtle discriminations that perplex even judges in their chambers." :' With-
out judicial guidance, an officer's decision about when to enter a home with-
out a warrant will be even more difficult than it was prior to Payton.
Ultimately, the Court will be unable to avoid a discussion of exigent cir-
cumstances. As prosecutors seek to prevent the exclusion of evidence follow-
ing warrantless home arrests, they will argue that exigent circumstances
were present to validate the arrest. But, because the facts of Payton pre-
sented a sufficient basis to discuss the exigent circumstances exception to the
arrest warrant requirement, the Court should have taken the opportunity to
avoid lower court confusion and conflicts.
ALTERNATIVES AND IMPACT
Due to the Payton Court's failure to discuss the exigent circumstances
exception to the arrest warrant requirement, this Note anticipates the poten-
tial contours of that exception. This discussion illustrates that the Court's
failure to illuminate the exigent circumstances exception leaves Payton's re-
percussions on law enforcement unclear. Finally, Payton's impact on the
preliminary hearing is discussed.
Exigent Circumstances
Although the Court failed to provide guidance as to what factors would
constitute exigent circumstances sufficient to overcome the arrest warrant
requirement, an examination of the case law suggests four possible
criteria." Specifically, police officers may be able to circumvent the warrant
requirement when time is insufficient to obtain one, when they are in hot
pursuit of a suspect, when the arrest arises from a continuous investigation
or when the facts indicate that, in the balance, a homeowner's right of pri-
vacy outweighs society's interest in apprehending criminal suspects.
80. The Court could have established factors sufficient to obviate the arrest warrant require-
ment and then remanded the cases for a determination of the necessary facts.
81. 435 F.2d 385 (D.C. Cir. 1970). See note 54 supra.
82. 445 U.S. at 603 (White, J., dissenting).
83. Id. at 618-19.
84. It could be argued that the Court failed to discuss the exigent circumstances exception
because a considerable body of lower case law exists on the subject. See notes 92-102 &
107-111 infra.
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Time to Obtain a Warrant
The first possible exigent circumstance is the existence of insufficient time
to obtain a warrant. The Court treated the arrests in Payton as routine
arrests for which police had ample time to procure warrants. 5 Thus, the
Court implied that whenever time exists to obtain a warrant, a warrant will
be constitutionally required. The post-Payton decision, People v.
Montgomerym is in accordance with this reading of Payton. The Montgon-
ery court found that police had waited seven days to arrest the defendant
and then had failed to obtain an arrest warrant before entering the defend-
ant's home. 7 Because ample time existed to obtain a warrant, the court
held the arrest invalid.M
Still, the question remains-what time is ample to obtain a warrant? In
the pre-Payton decision, United States v. Shye, 5 the United States Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit rejected the argument that a lengthy delay
between the time officers establish probable cause to arrest and the time
they actually arrest the suspect always indicates that there was ample time
to obtain a warrant. In Shye, the officers admittedly decided to forgo obtain-
ing a warrant; 9° however, the court upheld the warrantless arrest because an
unexpected and intervening event necessitated the quick arrest.9 Thus,
when an officer has exercised undue delay in obtaining a warrant, his or her
intrusion into a home to arrest will nevertheless be valid if the entry is in
response to an arrestee's unexpected actions.9" A simple computation of
time expiring between the finding of probable cause and the arrest is in-
adequate.
Hot Pursuit
Past Supreme Court decisions indicate that an entry into the home to
arrest following a chase of a defendant could also become an exception to the
Payton arrest warrant requirement. In Warden v. Hayden,3 a decision con-
85. 445 U.S. at 583.
86. 84 Ill. App. 3d 695, 405 N.E.2d 1275 (1st Dist. 1980).
87. Id. at 696, 405 N.E.2d at 1277.
88. Id. at 701, 405 N.E.2d at 1280.
89. 492 F.2d 886 (6th Cir. 1974).
90. Id. at 888.
91. Id. at 892. The unexpected and intervening event which necessitated the warrantless
entry into the apartment was the sudden opening of the apartment door and the announcement
from someone within that several men were departing. Prior to this announcement, the officers
had received no response when they knocked on the apartment door and had heard no noise
inside the apartment. Id. at 888.
92. Cf. McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451 (1948) (warrantless arrest invalidated be-
cause officers waited several months to arrest petitioner and because they were not responding
to an emergency situation in making the arrest); Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10 (1948)
(warrantless arrest invalidated because police had time to obtain a warrant).
93. 387 U.S. 294 (1967). See notes 42-46 and accompanying text supra.
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cerned primarily with search warrants, the Court upheld a warrantless entry
into a home because the arresting officers were in hot pursuit of the ar-
restee. Specifically, the suspect had been seen just five minutes before
police followed him into his home." Furthermore, in United States v.
Santana,9 the Court upheld a warrantless arrest that occurred in a doorway
as the defendant attempted to flee into her home. The Court ruled that a
retreat into the home during a chase did not invalidate a warrantless arrest.9
Despite wide acceptance of the hot pursuit doctrine,97 a pursuit into the
home may not always be a valid exception. If the police officer waits ouside
the home with the intention of arresting the suspect on his doorstep, the
arrest warrant requirement is not dislodged by subsequent pursuit into the
suspect's home. For example, in Accarino v. United Statesm the court re-
jected the hot pursuit argument, noting that the officers waited until the
arrestee was on his doorstep before approaching him. The Court reasoned
that if an emergency created the need to effect a warrantless arrest, the
officers caused it.9
Continuous Police Investigations
An offshoot of the hot pursuit exception to the arrest warrant requirement
is the concept of a continuous police investigation. The post-Payton decision
of the Illinois Supreme Court in People v. Abney"'° recognized continuous
police investigation as an exception to the arrest warrant requirement.
There, police interviewed the victim of a beating shortly after the attack,
learning the assailant's name and discovering that the assailant walked to-
ward his home after the assault.'o Within one and one half hours after the
attack, officers entered the defendant's home without a warrant. The su-
preme court upheld the warrantless entry, noting that any delay in obtaining
a warrant would have impeded a promising police investigation '0' and stress-
94. 387 U.S. at 294.
95. 427 U.S. 38 (1976).
96. Id. at 42-43. But cf. People v. Strelow, 96 Mich. App. 182, 190-91, 292 N.W.2d 517,
520-21 (1980) (hot pursuit is not an exception to the arrest warrant requirement when the
arrestee has only committed a misdemeanor).
97. See, e.g., United States v. Campbell, 581 F.2d 22 (2d Cir. 1978) (hot pursuit is an
illustration of exigent circumstance).
98. 179 F.2d 456 (D.C. Cir. 1949).
99. Id. at 464-65.
100. 81 111. 2d 159, 407 N.E.2d 543 (1980).
101. Id. at 162, 407 N.E.2d at 544.
102. Id. Accord, Salvador v. United States, 505 F.2d 1348 (8th Cir. 1974) (warrantless entry
to arrest upheld when police followed the suspects to their apartment); United States v. Harris,
435 F.2d 74 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (warrantless entry to arrest upheld because it was incident to a
continuous investigation); Dorman v. United States, 435 F.2d 385 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (warrantless
entry upheld where it was made four hours after the offense); Washington v. United States, 263
F.2d 742 (D.C. Cir. 1959) (warrantless entry upheld where it occurred shortly after the offense);
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ing that there was no unjustified delay in completing the arrest which would
have given the officers time to obtain a warrant. "' Thus, at least in Illinois,
continuous investigative pursuits leading to the arrestee's home have be-
come an exception to the Payton arrest warrant requirement.
The Dorman Factors
The fourth determination the courts might make is based on the factors
outlined by Dorman v. United States,"' that balance the homeowner's right
to privacy against society's right to apprehend suspects quickly. These seven
factors include; (1) the gravity of the offense; (2) the danger the offender
poses to the community; (3) a strong showing of probable cause to arrest; (4)
strong reason to believe the suspect is within the home about to be entered;
(5) the likelihood that the suspect will escape if the home is not entered
immediately; 10 5 (6) the peacefulness of the entry; and (7) the time of the
entry.' These factors have already received wide acceptance 1117 and may
prove a helpful tool for courts faced with this issue in the future.
Impact
Until the courts determine which, if any, of the four criteria discussed
above constitute exigent circumstances sufficient to overcome the arrest war-
rant requirement, the question of Payton's impact on the law will remain
unanswered. Before this position can be fully understood, the underlying
doctrine of arrest challenges must be examined. The United States Supreme
Court has held that once a person is arrested, police may conduct a warrant-
less search. This warrantless search incident to a valid arrest is one of the
exceptions to the fourth amendment search warrant requirement. "" The
Stuck v. State, 255 Ind. 350, 264 N.E.2d 611 (1970) (warrantless entry upheld because police
were involved in a continuous investigation and arrest occurred shortly after the offense was
committed); Nilson v. State, 272 Md. 179, 321 A.2d 301 (1974) (warrantless entry upheld where
it occurred one hour -after the offense).
103. 81 111. 2d at 170, 407 N.E.2d at 548.
104. 435 F.2d 385, 392-93 (D.C. Cir. 1970). See notes 51-55 and accompanying text supra.
105. A post-Payton decision, State v. Rubert, 46 Or. App. 843, 612 P.2d 771 (1980), consid-
ered the likelihood of immediate escape factor. The Rubert court held that an officer must
reasonably explain why an escape is expected or this factor will not excuse the failure to obtain
a warrant. Id. at 845, 612 P.2d at 772-73. Accord, State v. Olson, 287 Or, 157, 165, 598 P.2d
670, 674 (1979) (because suspect had no reason to believe police knew of his involvement in the
crime, there was no danger of his immediate escape); Laasch v. State, 84 Wis. 2d 587, 592, 267
N.W.2d 278, 282 (1978) (defendant had been released from jail for two weeks so police could
not reasonably assert that they feared she would flee).
106. 435 F.2d at 392-93.
107. See note 54 supra. Following Payton, the Illinois Supreme Court applied these factors
in People v. Abney, 81 111. 2d 159, 407 N.E.2d 543 (1980).
108. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969) (a police officer can conduct a warrantless
search of the arrestee's area of control once he has legally arrested the suspect). See generally
Lewis, Mannle & Allen, The Burger Court and Searches Incident to a Lawful Arrest: The
Current Perspective, 7 CAl. U.L. R\'. 1 (1977).
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treatment of evidence uncovered during such searches is the key to Payton's
impact. This evidence is admissable only if the arrest is valid; hence, if an
arrest is invalid, the evidence will be excluded from the trial pursuant to the
exclusionary rule."° It is because they seek to invoke the exclusionary rule
that defendants challenge the validity of their arrests. If the exclusionary
rule did not exist, an arrest challenge, even if sustained would be of little
value to a defendant since an invalid arrest will not deny the court jurisdic-
tion over the defendant or void a conviction.""
It is readily apparent that if the lower courts adopt an expansive inter-
pretation of the exigent circumstances exception, more warrantless arrests
will be held valid. Consequently, less evidence will be suppressed and
Payton will affect the outcome of fewer individual cases. Conversely, a re-
strictive reading of what constitutes exigent circumstances will result in
more warrantless arrests being found invalid, thereby increasing Payton's
impact.
One indication that the courts might adopt a restrictive interpretation is
that of the three courts to consider the question of warrantless home arrests
since Payton, only one court upheld the warrantless arrest."' Nevertheless,
until more decisions are reached, the question of Payton's impact on law
enforcement will remain unanswered. Although the Payton decision's impact
on law enforcement is still unclear, its adverse impact on the preliminary
hearing requirement is certain. The right to a post-arrest preliminary hear-
ing was established in Gerstein v. Pugh.2 In requiring preliminary hear-
ings, the Gerstein Court reasoned that because it did not require police to
obtain an arrest warrant before arresting a suspect, it would require a post-
109. The exclusionary rule provides that all evidence obtained through means that violate the
United States Constitution will be excluded from criminal prosecutions. Thus, if an arrest is
obtained through unconstitutional means, any evidence seized as a result of that arrest will be
excluded from the arrestee's trial. The exclusionary rule was first applied in federal prosecutions
only. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914). Since 1961, however, the exclusionary rule
has been applied to the states as well. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). See generally
Exclusionary Rule: A Panel, 61 F.R.D. 259 (1972); S. SCHLESIN R, EXCL SIONARY INIUSTI(C::
THE PROBLEM OF ILLEGALLY OBTAINED EVIDENCE (1977); Geller, Enforcing the Fourth Amend-
nent: The Exclusionary Rule and its Alternatives, 1975 WAsI. U.L.Q. 621 (1976): Wilkey, The
Exclusionary Rule: Why Suppress Valid Evidence?, 62 JUD. 214 (1978).
110. See, e.g., United States v. Crews, 445 U.S. 463, 474 (1980) (illegal arrest of petitioner will
not deny a court the right to try petitioner); Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519, 522 (1952) (even if
a defendant is forcibly abducted and brought to trial, the court still has the power to try): Ker
v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436, 444 (1886) (by implication) (Illinois courts have jurisdiction to try
defendant even though he was forcibly abducted in Peru); Vance v. North Carolina, 432 F.2d
984, 990 (4th Cir. 1970) (the rationale behind the refusal to void the defendant's conviction
entirely is the assumption that if the invalid arrest had not occurred, the defendant would have
been arrested eventually anyway).
111. The three post-Payton cases are: People v. Abney, 81 Ill. 2d 159, 407 N.E.2d 543
(1980); People v. Montgomery, 84 I11. App. 3d 695, 405 N.E.2d 1275 (1st Dist. 1980). State v.
Rubert, 46 Or. App. 843, 612 P.2d 771 (1980). Only the Abney decision upheld the warrantless
arrest.
112. 420 U.S. 103 (1975).
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arrest preliminary hearing to determine if probable cause existed for the
arrest. "'
The Payton decision could be used to undercut this hearing requirement
for arrests occurring within the home. For example, it could be argued that
once a pre-arrest warrant is required, the reason for conducting a Gerstein
preliminary hearing vanishes. "' Based on Payton, courts might determine
that a defendant arrested in his home pursuant to an arrest warrant is not
entitled to a preliminary hearing.
It might be argued that because a pre-arrest warrant and a post-arrest
preliminary hearing were both designed to establish whether probable cause
to arrest the defendant existed, the substitution of one for the other should
make no difference. This argument, however is faulty. By its very nature,
the preliminary hearing provides the defendant several advantages that a
pre-arrest warrant procedure could never provide. First, the defendant is
present at this hearing."5 Witnesses are examined at the preliminary
hearing" 6 and in states such as Illinois, defendants also are provided with a
transcript of the hearing."7 This transcript is a valuable discovery tool and
also can be used to impeach witnesses at the trial should inconsistencies
arise in a witness's testimony."' In contrast, a pre-arrest warrant procedure
is an ex parte hearing. Thus, while the theoretical underpinnings of an arrest
warrant and a preliminary hearing are the same, the ramifications of the two
procedures are quite different.
Due to these substantive differences between the two procedures courts
or lawmakers may determine that the preliminary hearing requirement
should remain intact despite the Payton decision. If this determination is not
made, criminal defendants arrested within their homes might soon be faced
with the uncomfortable prospect of losing their right to a preliminary hear-
ing.
CONCLUSION
Based upon Payton, a police officer will be required to obtain an arrest
warrant before entering a home to arrest the home's resident. Because this
decision finally places the law of arrests within a home on the same constitu-
tional ground as the law of searches within a home, the decision represents a
113. Id. at 113-14.
114. The argument that the Gerstein preliminary hearing requirement will not apply if the
defendant was arrested pursuant to an arrest warrant also was suggested in 2 W. LAFAVE,
SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 5.1, at 247-48 (1st ed. 1978).
115. K. WELLS & P. WESTON, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE AND TRIAL PRACTICE 48-49 (1st ed.
1977).
116. Id.
117. People v. Moore, 51 111. 2d 79, 281 N.E.2d 294 (1972) (indigent defendant is entitled to
a free copy of his preliminary hearing transcript).
118. K. WELLS & P. WESTON, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE AND TRIAL PRACTICE 49 (1st ed. 1977).
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correct and desirable expansion of fourth amendment rights. Two factors,
however, might curtail this expansion of personal liberty for criminal defen-
dants. First, because the Court created an exception to the arrest warrant
rule and then refused to define that exception, the possibility exists that
lower courts may readily find exceptions to the Payton arrest warrant rule. If
this occurs, Payton's desirable impact on law enforcement will be minimal.
In addition, Payton leaves the status of preliminary hearings in doubt. If the
courts determine that defendants arrested within their homes pursuant to a
warrant are no longer entitled to a preliminary hearing, these defendants
will lose a valuable discovery tool-a preliminary hearing transcript. Thus,
criminal defendants faced with the prospect of losing their preliminary hear-
ing might find Payton to curtail rather than expand their liberties.
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